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Abstract 
Policymakers in developing countries increasingly see science, technology, and innovation (STI) as 
an avenue for meeting sustainable development goals (SDGs), with STI-based startups as a key part 
of these efforts. Market failures call for government interventions in supporting STI for SDGs and 
publicly-funded incubators can potentially fulfil this role. Using the specific case of India, we 
examine how publicly-funded incubators could contribute to strengthening STI-based 
entrepreneurship. India’s STI policy and its links to societal goals span multiple decades—but since 
2015 these goals became formally organized around the SDGs. We examine why STI-based 
incubators were created under different policy priorities before 2015, the role of public agencies in 
implementing these policies, and how some incubators were particularly effective in addressing the 
societal challenges that can now be mapped to SDGs. We find that effective incubation for 
supporting STI-based entrepreneurship to meet societal goals extended beyond traditional 
incubation activities. For STI-based incubators to be effective, policymakers must strengthen the 
‘incubation system’. This involves incorporating targeted SDGs in specific incubator goals, 
promoting coordination between existing incubator programs, developing a performance 
monitoring system, and finally, extending extensive capacity building at multiple levels including for 
incubator managers and for broader STI in the country.  
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1. Introduction 
Policymakers and scholars—especially in developing countries—have long perceived that innovation 
and entrepreneurial activity can potentially generate new ways to advance economic development, 
employment, and more effective and efficient delivery of services (Acs et al., 2008; Audretsch et al., 
2007; Naudé, 2010; OECD, 2013; Szirmai et al., 2011). A key focus of public policies for 
strengthening science, technology, and innovation (STI) in developing countries has been through 
promoting entrepreneurship and supporting such startups through public incubators—traditionally 
defined as formally organized entities formed with governmental support that offer various services 
for the conversion of individual ideas from high-risk innovation and early-stage startup incubatees to 
more advanced, market-oriented enterprises. Countries like India, Brazil, and China have had long-
running public incubator programs aimed at advancing economic and social development while 
countries elsewhere, e.g. in Africa, have recently started to expand STI-based incubator activity 
(Akçomak, 2009; Chandra and Fealey, 2009; Chandra and Silva, 2012; Dalmarco et al., 2018; Lalkaka, 2002; 
Scaramuzzi, 2002; Tang et al., 2013; The Economist, 2017). 
 
While developing countries have had a range of economic, social, and environmental objectives for 
several decades, the 2030 Agenda and the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
in 2015 formalized these goals globally and in that process, cemented the importance of STI and 
entrepreneurship in the SDGs and their implementation (UNFCCC, 2018)1. The broader 
 
 
1 Goal 8: Decent work and economic growth target 8.3 mentions promoting “development-oriented policies that support 
productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation…” (United Nations, 2015). Goal 
9:Industries, innovation, and infrastructure specifically aims to enhance innovation and research and development activities in 
target 9.5 (United Nations, 2015). Similarly, Goal 13: Climate action links to the Paris Agreement; the latter states that 
“Accelerating, encouraging and enabling innovation is critical for an effective, long-term global response to climate 
change and promoting economic growth and sustainable development” (UNFCCC, 2015; United Nations, 2015). 
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recognition of the role of STI for SDGs is translating to an exploration of concrete actions on 
startup incubators and entrepreneurial activity that incubators can help promote to implement these 
goals.2 Given the renewed emphasis of incubators and startups in the context of SDGs, questions 
emerge for policymakers on how publicly-funded incubators in developing countries can most 
effectively link STI-based entrepreneurship with multiple SDGs. 
 
Despite the significance of incubators in linking STI with SDGs, there is a gap in the understanding 
of incubators’ goals, activities, and their contributions to developmental outcomes in developing 
countries. Extant literature has extensively analyzed incubators and their impact on innovation and 
entrepreneurship largely in European countries, the United States, or other industrialized countries 
(see, for example, Dutt et al., 2015; Kochenkova et al., 2016; Mian et al., 2016; Phan et al., 2005), 
noting that there is no single or consistent framework of assessment to measure ‘success’ (Phan et 
al., 2005). Studies on developing countries are few—most studies analyze incubator activity under 
broader assessments of STI and entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2008; Akçomak, 2009; Autio et al., 
2014; Naude, 2013; Naudé, 2010) while only a few studies analyze what incubators have actually 
accomplished (Akçomak, 2009; Lalkaka, 2002; Tang et al., 2013). There is a substantial distinction 
between the traditional incubators in industrialized country contexts and the incubators in 
developing country contexts, though. The traditional incubators in industrialized countries act as 
intermediaries who complement other actors in what are often already strong innovation systems 
 
 
2 For example, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the financial arm of the UNFCCC plans to support climate technology 
incubators and accelerators in developing countries. As part of this, the GCF, in partnership with the Technology 
Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) of the UNFCCC held a global 
dialogue in 2018 to advance climate technology incubators in developing countries (Green Climate Fund, 2018; 
UNFCCC, 2018) 
 
 
 
4 
and strong institutions to support and expand private-sector-driven technology innovation. While 
industrialized countries do have publicly-funded incubators to meet specific policy goals by 
supporting high-risk startups (e.g., Leyden and Link, 2015), they are still operating in a well-
resourced and dynamic innovation context. In contrast, in developing countries, incubators have 
been a central element of STI policy extending their role beyond intermediary organizations. For 
many decades, incubators have focused on achieving the social, environmental, and economic goals 
now embodied in the SDGs. These SDG related goals are unlikely to be addressed by innovation 
systems that generally are characterized by resource constraints, weak innovation institutions, and 
sporadic dynamism at best in private and public actors. Multiple market and policy shortcomings—
e.g., related to underdeveloped institutions, lack of human and financial resources, insufficient 
paying capacity by beneficiaries (Khanna and Palepu, 1997)—exacerbate the ability to develop new 
knowledge or to effectively translate it into application, leading to underinvestment by the private 
sector in innovation or in high-risk startups. At the same time, insufficient monetization of public 
goods (often central to the SDGs) further impedes private sector investment and activities in these 
areas. While literature on incubators has recognized the need for context-specific analysis of 
incubator goals and outcomes, literature on incubators in developing countries is disproportionately 
low despite the clear contrasts in the role of incubators in industrialized and developing countries. 
 
This paper addresses the following research questions: to what extent have STI-based incubators 
and the startups that they support historically helped to implement the development objectives of 
the kind now organized around SDGs in developing countries? And how might they better help 
achieve the SDGs? To address these questions, we examine India’s incubator experiences from three 
perspectives. First, focusing on the policy drivers and development goals for STI-based 
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entrepreneurship, we assess why publicly-funded incubators were created. Second, focusing on the 
public agencies responsible for designing and implementing government-led programs for 
supporting STI-based entrepreneurship, we analyze what these agencies did to implement policies 
using incubators as intermediaries and what were the outcomes. Third, focusing on actual 
incubators, we analyze how incubators have been effective in the context of implementing societal 
goals that map to the SDGs. An analysis of these experiences then allows us to reflect on how these 
incubators could better help India achieve its SDGs, with the expectation that many of these lessons 
may also be useful for other developing countries. 
 
While our analysis on the potential relevance of incubators for implementing SDGs focuses on 
India, we suggest that it is suitable for a case study because its incubator activities echo global 
trends—from its historical multi-decade experience in governmental STI-based entrepreneurship 
programs that led to the creation of over 1403 incubators between 1985-2014, to renewed policy 
emphasis since the mid 2010s that called for supporting startups by massively expanding the number 
of existing incubators (alongside improving other factors such as easing regulatory barriers, 
providing high-risk funding for startups, and increasing innovation capacity)4. But despite three 
decades of continued experiences linked to incubators and whether they met societal, 
environmental, or economic development goals, limited systematic analyses exist of one of the 
longest running governmental efforts to promote STI-based entrepreneurship in a major developing 
country (GIZ, 2012; Lalkaka, 2002; Tang et al., 2014). As recent STI policies start to prioritize the 
 
 
3 Author calculations 
4 In 2014-2016, STI-based entrepreneurship became a specific policy priority and the government announced a set of 
ambitious national-level policies (e.g., Startup India, Atal Innovation Mission) and various regional-level initiatives for 
startups 
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expansion of incubators while being explicitly linked to the SDGs(UN India, 2019a, 2019b, p. 9), an 
analysis of India’s rich past experiences can provide useful lessons for itself as well as other 
developing countries that have new and ambitious plans to mobilize STI-based entrepreneurship for 
implementing SDGs. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background on public policy 
for STI-based entrepreneurship and incubators. Section 3 focuses on the case context and our 
approach for the analysis of incubators in India. Section 4 discusses our results on the policy 
motivations behind why incubators were created, what public agencies did to implement policy and 
what were the outcomes, and finally how incubators were able to implement societal goals that map 
to the SDGs. Section 5 highlights policy implications for incubators in India and other developing 
countries. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background 
In this section, we highlight the literature on STI-based entrepreneurship and startups in developing 
countries (2.1), how incubators broadly support STI-based entrepreneurship (2.2), and finally, the 
specific role incubators play in developing countries (2.3). 
 
2.1. STI policy and startups in developing countries 
The importance of innovation and entrepreneurship in pushing economic development has been 
long established, with clear recognition of science and technology as precursors to innovation 
(Freeman and Soete, 1997; Naudé, 2010; OECD, 2013; Schumpeter, 1934; Szirmai et al., 2011). 
Consequently, governments have focused on generating and supporting STI-related activities 
expecting economic welfare outcomes such as employment and industrial competitiveness. STI 
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policy (in industrialized as well as developing countries) has emphasized on three areas. One, 
strengthening the ‘supply-side’ for STI—e.g., by promoting science and technology-based education, 
setting up research and development (R&D) laboratories, funding R&D in universities, creating 
science and technology-based large public enterprises, improving intellectual property rights (IPR). 
(e.g., Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2014; Fagerberg et al., 2005; Nelson, 1993). Two, supporting 
entrepreneurship at large—e.g., by implementing policies and programs that finance small and 
medium business or startups, easing regulatory barriers to start or end a business. (e.g., Acs and 
Szerb, 2007; Minniti, 2008). Three (discussed in more detail in 2.2), strengthening the links between 
STI, entrepreneurs, startups, and markets—e.g., through setting up incubators (and other 
intermediaries like science parks, technology transfer centers, etc.) that support technology transfer 
especially for technologies that would be unable to advance to market in the absence of different 
types of public support (e.g., Mian et al., 2016; Phan et al., 2005).  
 
In the context of implementing SDGs, the link between STI and specific SDGs has become most 
apparent in the emergence of startups linked to the SDGs and the incubators that would support 
these (See Table 1). While startups have become attractive in industrialized and developing countries 
alike because of their perceived ability to be nimble and to quickly adapt to market needs (and 
therefore deliver quick results), STI-based startups for SDGs in developing countries face a unique 
set of interrelated challenges. First, while startups are risky by definition—the risks are amplified for 
STI product based startups (compared to service based startups) because of risks of technology 
failure, the unavailability of infrastructures to support technologies, the lack of technology-trained 
human capacity needed for success (Autio et al., 2014; Ghani et al., 2014). Second, the success of STI-
based startups depends in multiple ways on the private sector. But because of multiple market 
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failures in developing countries, the private sector has undervalued the long-term societal benefits of 
implementing SDGs and has underinvested in STI-based startups. These market failures include: (a) 
lack of resources to test or validate risky STI-based ideas, (b) paucity of early adopters willing to take 
up new technologies, (c) lack of long-term investment in STI-based startups (excluding IT-based 
startups) that clashes with the long timescales needed for STI-based startups to demonstrate 
outcomes (STI based startups may need more time to create or test prototypes, to manage supply 
chains and physical distribution of the product, and to demonstrate market acceptance), and (d) low 
monetary returns for public goods related to SDGs despite their high societal benefits (e.g., Khanna 
and Palepu, 1997). Overall, effective government-led activities that link STI-based startups with the 
implementation of SDGs would need to incorporate the unique context and challenges that such 
startups may face in developing countries.  
 
TABLE 1: Examples of the links between STI and SDGs from India and other developing countries, including 
some examples of incubators whose operations directly map to the SDGs. 
  
Sustainable 
Development Goals 
Description Illustrative examples of the growing links between STI and SDGs from India 
and other developing countries 
1 No poverty End poverty in all its forms 
everywhere 
Mobile banking supports low income households get access to banking with low 
transactional costs. Startups like Kenya’s M-Pesa operate in this space and have 
contributed to lifting households out of poverty (Suri and Jack, 2016).  
2 Zero hunger End hunger, achieve food 
security and improved 
nutrition and promote 
sustainable agriculture 
Indigram Labs Foundation, an incubator in India, focuses on agriculture technology. 
Its incubatee startups include New Leaf Dynamic Technologies that is building off-
grid cold storage units for farmers to help minimize post-harvest losses (Indigram 
Labs, 2018). 
3 Good health and 
well-being 
Ensure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for all 
at all ages 
MicroMek is a startup based in Malawi that aims to develop low-cost autonomous 
drones to deliver medicines and health care supplies to remote populations (Kaliati, 
2019)  
4 Quality education Quality education Injini, a pan-African incubator, focuses on education technology. Its incubatee 
startups included M-Shule, a startup from Kenya, that aimed to develop an adaptive 
learning platform that could deliver personalized lessons through SMS (Injini, 2019). 
5 Gender equality Achieve gender equality and 
empower all women and 
girls 
Solar Sister is a startup based in Sub-Saharan Africa and empowers women to become 
entrepreneurs by bringing clean energy into their communities through women-led 
enterprises (Solar Sister, 2019) 
6 Clean water and 
sanitation 
Ensure access to water and 
sanitation for all 
India’s Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) organized a “Grand 
Challenge” competition for startups that link to the government-led mission of clean 
water and sanitation (Swachh Bharat Mission). One of the winning startups, Altersoft 
Innovations, is developing smart, self-cleaning public toilets using internet of things 
(IoT) technologies (DIPP, 2018). 
7 Affordable and 
clean energy 
Ensure access to affordable, 
reliable, sustainable and 
modern energy 
M-Kopa is a Kenya-based startup that sells solar home systems and allows buyers to 
make digital payments in a pay-as-you-go model (M-Kopa, 2019) 
8 Decent work and 
economic growth 
Promote inclusive and 
sustainable economic 
growth, employment and 
In Uttar Pradesh (the most populous state in India), the state Information Technology 
(IT) and Startup policy aims to use IT as a way of bringing in economic growth and 
has established four incubators as part of this effort (Government of Uttar Pradesh, 
2017). 
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decent work for all5 
9 Industry 
innovation and 
infrastructure 
Build resilient 
infrastructure, promote 
sustainable industrialization 
and foster innovation6 
Supporter by India’s Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council (BIRAC), 
the Centre for Cellular and Molecular Platforms (C-CAMP) runs an incubator that 
focuses on supporting STI-based startups in the life sciences industry (C-CAMP, 
2019) 
10 Reduced 
inequalities 
Reduce inequality within 
and among countries 
The Assistive Technology Accelerator (ATA) based in India supports startups and 
persons with disability. Its incubatee startups include Eye-D that is developing an app 
to help visually impaired with travel, identification of objects, and reading text 
(Assistive Technology Accelerator, 2019) 
11 Sustainable cities 
and communities 
Make cities inclusive, safe, 
resilient and sustainable 
Mellowcabs is a South African startup that manufactures and operates solar-powered 
electric pedicabs and improves first and last mile public transportation in urban areas 
(Mellowcabs, 2019) 
12 Responsible 
consumption and 
production 
Ensure sustainable 
consumption and 
production patterns 
Fly Catcher Technologies is an Indian startup that develops storage units to convert 
organic waste into biogas for household use (DIPP, 2018) (also part of the Swachh 
Bharat Grand Challenge, see SDG 6) 
13 Climate action Take urgent action to 
combat climate change and 
its impacts 
The Global Cleantech Innovation Program led by the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
aims to strengthen the entrepreneurial innovation ecosystem in developing countries 
and supports demand-driven small and medium enterprises and startups (UNIDO and 
GEF, 2018). The Green Climate Fund (GCF) is planning a program to support 
climate technology incubators and accelerators in developing countries (Green Climate 
Fund, 2018; UNFCCC, 2018). 
14 Life below water Conserve and sustainably 
use the oceans, seas and 
marine resources 
Evoware is an Indonesia-based startup that is developing edible seaweed-based 
packaging to replace plastic packaging that is a major contributor to marine pollution 
(New Plastics Economy, 2019)  
15 Life on land Sustainably manage forests, 
combat desertification, halt 
and reverse land 
degradation, halt 
biodiversity loss 
Green Charcoal is a Uganda-based startup that replaces wood charcoal and firewood 
with agricultural waste (e.g. rice husk) (Green Charcoal Uganda, 2019).  
16 Peace, justice and 
strong 
institutions 
Promote just, peaceful and 
inclusive societies 
UNDP Honduras developed a pilot ‘Fab Lab’ to 3D print hand prostheses for 
returning migrants and victims of violence who live with disabilities (UNDP, 2018a) 
17 Partnerships for 
the goals 
Revitalize the global 
partnership for sustainable 
development 
The Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN) of the UNFCCC consists of a 
worldwide network of organizations that support the development and transfer of 
climate technologies to developing countries (CTCN, 2016) 
 
The discourse on the types of government-led action needed for linking STI and SDGs has focused 
on setting up global, national, and subnational roadmaps that can help, among others, link STI 
policy with the 2030 Agenda and create enabling conditions to support a robust innovation system 
(IATT, 2018). Effective roadmaps need an evidence base that builds on specific experiences of 
 
 
5 Goal 8 has specific targets that explicitly link to STI. For example, Target 8.2 aims for “economic productivity through 
diversification, technological upgrading and innovation…”. Target 8.3 supports “…productive activities, decent job 
creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and 
medium-sized enterprises…” (United Nations, 2015) 
6 Goal 9 has specific targets that explicitly link to STI. For example, Target 9.5 aims to “enhance scientific research, 
upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, in particular developing countries, including, 
by 2030, encouraging innovation and substantially increasing the number of research and development workers per 1 
million people and public and private research and development spending.” Target 9.B supports “domestic technology 
development, research and innovation in developing countries…” (United Nations, 2015) 
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developing countries in linking SDGs (and, in the past, related development goals) with policies for 
STI. In this aspect, as we show in the following sections 2.2 and 2.3, incubators have played a vital 
role. 
 
2.2. Incubators for STI-based entrepreneurship 
Incubators have been a vital element of STI policy (Aernoudt, 2004; Mian et al., 2016; Phan et al., 
2005) in their role as intermediaries that link startups with networks of universities, investors, 
industry, government, etc. (Dutt et al., 2015; Peters et al., 2004). Incubators originated in the 1980s 
in the United States and have since been used worldwide (Akçomak, 2009; Allen and McCluskey, 
1991). Estimates indicate nearly 7,000 incubator programs around the world of which a third focus 
on STI-based entrepreneurship (Mian et al., 2016). While various incubator configurations exist 
(such as accelerators and science parks), incubators are generally considered not-for-profit entities 
that receive varying levels of assistance from public funding bodies and provide long duration 
support for startups (up to five years) to help the conversion of individual early stage, high-risk ideas 
to marketable enterprises (Cohen, 2013; Dee et al., 2011; Hackett and Dilts, 2004; Mian et al., 2016). 
Incubators traditionally offer support services to startups including infrastructure (working space 
and associated basic physical infrastructure, workshops), finance, business capability (mentoring, 
training, consulting), and access to networks (Amezcua et al., 2013; Cohen, 2013; Dee et al., 2011; 
Dutt et al., 2015; Hackett and Dilts, 2004). Overall, incubators play a vital role in strengthening the 
ecosystem in which startups operate. 
 
A rich body of literature on incubators in industrialized countries has shown that incubators have 
diverse types of primary goals and operational activities related to their incubatee startups, and these 
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result in different types of innovation-related outcomes. For example, incubator goals could vary in 
the focus on broad STI or on the development and transfer of specific technologies, in the emphasis 
on economic development and employment generation, or in the linkages to universities or private 
sector, while outcomes could be linked to product-, process- or organizational- innovation (Barbero 
et al., 2014). In particular, STI-based incubators support the transfer of technology and help 
promote STI-based entrepreneurship. STI-based incubators with close linkages to universities or 
research centers (a) get access to knowledge-based assets (such as technically-trained students and 
faculty) (e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005a), (b) help in incubatee startup 
survival (Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005b), and (c) provide help for incubatee startups in developing 
networks (Lamine et al., 2016; McAdam et al., 2016; McAdam and McAdam, 2008). The linkages 
between STI-based incubators and universities not only have innovation-related outcomes but also 
help in implementing regional economic development goals as the localized clusters and regional 
networks formed promote entrepreneurial culture, information sharing, knowledge spillovers within 
and across firms and academia, and additional innovations (Saxenian, 1996).  
 
While it is clear that incubator goals and activities dictate outcomes, there is no universal 
framework for assessing ‘success’ (Phan et al., 2005). Incubators have been subject to extensive 
scrutiny worldwide in terms of their formation and function, their performance outputs and 
outcomes, and on their linkages with public and private actors (Bergek and Norrman, 2008; Dee et 
al., 2011; Hackett and Dilts, 2004; Phan et al., 2005). However, there is no consensus on what 
defines success—measures of success could include survival, sales growth, employment growth, 
innovativeness of incubated firms, or meeting goals of the public sector (Akçomak, 2009). A 
meaningful analysis of incubator activities therefore requires an understanding of the context for 
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entrepreneurship (Autio et al., 2014), the underlying goals under which a specific incubator was set 
up (Bergek and Norrman, 2008), and the different incubation strategies or incubation business 
models applied in relation to various goals (Clarysse et al., 2005; Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005).  
 
Assessing the outcomes of existing incubators is critical for understanding the effectiveness of 
prevailing efforts and to justify future public spending in incubators for implementing SDGs. In the 
absence of a clear definition of incubator success, we use the term effective to describe incubators that 
have advanced SDGs (post 2015) or have advanced goals that can be mapped to the SDGs (pre 
2015). 
 
2.3 Incubators for STI-based entrepreneurship in developing countries 
Mian et al., (2016) shows that the large body of literature on publicly-funded incubators is principally 
based in industrialized countries of Europe or the United States. Less analyses exist on incubators in 
developing countries because the lack of frameworks of assessment, the lack of clarity in metrics of 
success, and the stark differences in policy goals of promoting STI-based entrepreneurship 
compared to the goals in developed countries (see 2.1) exacerbate the challenges with assessment. 
 
Research on incubation programs in developing countries remains limited to few countries (e.g., 
Akçomak, 2009; Chandra and Fealey, 2009; Chandra and Silva, 2012; Lalkaka, 2002; Scaramuzzi, 
2002; Tang et al., 2013). For example, in Brazil, incubators emerged when the government 
interventions in innovation shifted in the mid-1980s from the former military regime’s centralized 
large-technology projects to bottom-up innovation focusing on entrepreneurship at local and 
regional levels (Almeida, 2005; Chandra and Fealey, 2009; Etzkowitz et al., 2005). Brazilian 
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incubators now have visible and active linkages to universities, industry, and government reflecting 
the ‘triple-helix’ model of synergies between these three stakeholders (Akçomak, 2009; Chandra and 
Fealey, 2009; Etzkowitz, 2002). In India, the government started to fund incubators since the mid-
1980s as a means of developing STI-based entrepreneurial activity that would generate employment 
opportunities for a science and technology trained workforce (Lalkaka, 2002). In Chile, local 
governments collaborated with universities and industry to set up incubators since the early 1990s, 
paying particular attention to leveraging regional resources and to organizing risk capital and 
financing for early-stage startups as well as for incubators (Chandra and Silva, 2012). In contrast, 
incubators in China had a top-down mandate, with the government considering them as strategic 
avenues for technological advancement and economic development under China’s transition to a 
high technology-driven market economy (Chandra and Fealey, 2009). The government enabled STI-
based entrepreneurship by heavily funding and subsidizing a large number of high-technology 
incubators and their incubatees (giving special attention to the returning Chinese diaspora) 
(Akçomak, 2009; Chandra and Fealey, 2009).  
 
The emphasis on STI-based startups for implementing SDGs (2.1) and the role that incubators play 
in enabling conditions for these startups (2.2 and 2.3) calls for a systematic understanding of 
historical incubator experiences in developing countries for maximizing the effectiveness of 
emerging policies and programs.  
3. Case context and approach 
The rest of the paper focuses on India and analyzes the role of incubators in enabling STI-based 
entrepreneurship under evolving STI policy priorities. 
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3.1. Science technology and innovation in India 
India is one of the world’s fastest growing economies but its multiple market failures mean that it 
does poorly in many societal and environmental aspects, e.g. human development, income 
inequality, and greenhouse gas emissions (Alvaredo et al., 2018; UNDP, 2018b). Balancing economic 
growth with sustainable development challenges is thus not only central to policymaking in India, it 
reflects the challenges many developing countries currently face or can expect to face as they grow. 
 
Specifically, India is a suitable candidate for a case study on the role of STI-based incubators and 
startups and their potential for implementing SDGs because of three reasons. One, India has had 
over three decades of experience in linking STI with development goals, well before they were 
formalized in the SDGs in 2015. While countries like Brazil and China also have had multi-decade 
experiences, the context in which incubators emerged and STI policy evolved in India is shared by 
many other developing and emerging economies—e.g. in its experience with economic liberalization 
reforms, emergence of multinational companies and their R&D centers, the return of IT-trained 
diaspora interested in exploiting new entrepreneurial opportunities, and in its efforts to match global 
trends in emphasizing new and emerging models of innovation through startups.  
 
Two, India’s low score in various indicators of STI (Figure 1) and low levels of R&D investments, 
research personnel since the 1990s, and of patenting activity (Figure 2) are comparable to the 
situation in many other developing countries. Apart from a few leading institutions, the record of 
India’s technical higher education is rather spotty – only up to half of the engineering graduates are 
seen as employable (CII et al., 2018; Tandon, 2017). A large majority of small business that claim to 
engage in innovative activity do so on the basis of their use of new machines rather than their 
development of new STI-based processes or products (NSTMIS - DST GoI, 2014). While India has 
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always been an entrepreneurial country known for frugal, flexible innovations (e.g., Radjou et al., 
2012) and some widely cited reports suggest that its startup ecosystem follows that of the US or 
China (NASSCOM, 2015), not all entrepreneurial activities are associated with STI-based startups7. 
While such startups generate revenues, create employment, and are important for supporting 
economic growth, they represent business model innovations rather than STI. This means that 
India’s low score in STI indicators, its weaknesses in higher education, as well as its poor outcomes 
in terms of STI-based startups are reflective of the situation in other developing countries, especially 
when compared to China where many of these metrics are significantly higher. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: Selected country scores in the Global Innovation Index (2017) show that India scores low in various 
indicators of innovation compared with other major industrialized and developing countries. Furthermore, all 
developing countries demonstrate weaknesses in human capital, education, and research as well as knowledge, 
 
 
7 Despite the growing number of successful startups and entrepreneurs in India, not all entrepreneurs innovate in science 
and technology. Most commercially-successful Indian startups of the mid-2010s—for example, Naukri.com, Flipkart, 
Ola, Snapdeal, Zomato—have used established business ideas with proven international success and adapted them in the 
Indian market (see Raghavan, 2016). 
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technology, and creative outputs. Brackets next to countries show country ranking. Source: Cornell University et al., 
2017. 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Various indicators of science, technology, and innovation illustrate India’s continuously low inputs (e.g., (a) 
R&D investment), activities (e.g., (b) number of researchers) and outputs (e.g., (c) publications and (d) patents). Low 
R&D investments contribute to low number of researchers. And, even though science and technology publications have 
increased over time, they do not indicate an increase in STI given the small number of patents filed. Overall, India’s 
efforts are low compared to major economies such as China where the emphasis on STI rapidly took off in the past 
decade. Source: World Bank, 2017 
 
Three, India’s STI-related activities (including but not limited to R&D) have specifically linked to 
economic and sustainable development-related goals and incubators have been particularly 
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important in the implementation of that effort. This engagement has evolved from the post-
Independence approaches since the early 1950s in more centralized R&D8 and technology transfer 
from large public-sector agencies, governmental laboratories, and large industries and private firms, 
to supporting specific sectors such as biotechnology or information technology (IT), and more 
recently to a decentralized emphasis on STI-based entrepreneurial startups since the 2000s. The 
importance of incubators is evident in the establishment of the National Science and Technology 
Development Board that set up incubator-like entities since 1985. 
3.2. Approach 
 
We used process tracing (Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Collier, 2011) to assess the linkages STI policy 
and related publicly-funded incubators in India with societal and developmental goals (these goals 
existed for multiple decades but were organized around the SDGs after 2015). We used extensive 
archival research of government documents and semi-structured interviews (Appendix Table A1) 
with a variety of stakeholders for each of the following steps. First, to establish the links between 
STI policy and societal and developmental goals, we analyzed the evolution of public policy goals 
related to STI-based entrepreneurship and incubators over time. Next, to understand how policies 
for incubators were actually implemented by different actors in the innovation system, we analyzed 
the activities of a complex network of public agencies who funded incubators. Finally, to infer how 
individual incubators were able to actually implement the policy goals identified earlier, we identified 
 
 
8 These public institutions include (i) laboratories, e.g. the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research CSIR, (ii) large 
scientific agencies e.g., Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), (iii) public-
sector enterprises e.g., Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT), Indian Oil 
Corporation Limited (IOCL), and (iv) technical higher education institutions e.g., Indian Institutes of Technology IITs 
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six incubators (with the help of analysis and interviews of the previous two steps) that indicated 
effectiveness in implementation of societal and developmental goals using STI-based 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Because of the absence of a clear definition or metrics of incubator ‘success’, the six case studies that 
we identified as effective in meeting societal and developmental goals were based on inference from 
our analysis complemented with inputs from expert interviewees (Table 2). Our approach on the 
validating the study and its findings with multi-step interviews was driven by the lack of data on 
public funding for incubator-related activities—both in terms of how (and how much) funds were 
allocated and what have been the outcomes of public-funding or policy interventions. The lack of 
systematic data made it difficult to quantitatively assess over time all incubators, their interactions 
with government and other actors, or their changing goals, priorities, outputs, outcomes etc. We 
partially addressed issues related to the lack of data by developing our own database from 1985-2014 
of all publicly funded incubators that included public entities that received full or partial public-
funding to support STI-based entrepreneurship—this helped us identify an initial set of incubators 
which we then refined with the help of interviews.  
 
While our six incubators are by no means an exhaustive representation of incubation activities in 
India, they represent incubators with a spectrum of goals, locations, and partners that reflect the 
various operating conditions that incubators in developing countries may face—i.e., in locations with 
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access to different types of resources (e.g., location in metropolitan Tier I city9 with extensive 
financial and industrial resources and networks vs. location in smaller cities or towns with limited 
resources or networks), different sector-related priorities (e.g., biotechnology vs. information 
technology), and different incubator partners (e.g., engineering university vs. business school). For 
each individual incubator, we conducted semi-structured interviews (see Appendix table A2 for a list 
of questions) with the goal of understanding the evolution of incubator activities that had enabled 
implementation of societal and developmental goals that are now organized around SDGs. 
 
TABLE 2: Overview of incubators analyzed in this paper 
 
Incubator Host or Partner Host type Location Focus Type of 
location 
Center for Innovation 
Incubation and 
Entrepreneurship  
(CIIE) 
Indian Institute of 
Management, 
Ahmedabad (IIMA) 
Business 
School 
Ahmedabad1 Information technology, 
energy, water, agriculture, 
IoT, fintech, 
entrepreneurship 
Tier-1 
city 
Centre for Cellular and 
Molecular Platforms  
(C-CAMP) 
Bangalore Biotech 
Cluster 
Central 
Government 
Research Lab 
Bangalore1 Biotechnology, late-stage 
science 
Tier-1 
city 
Incubator at IKP Knowledge 
Park 
(IKP) 
IKP Foundation Foundation Hyderabad1 Biotechnology, hardware 
products, healthcare, 
medical devices 
Tier-1 
city 
Society for Innovation & 
Entrepreneurship  
(SINE) 
Indian Institute of 
Technology, 
Bombay (IITB)  
Engineering 
College 
Mumbai1 Information technology, 
intellectual property-based 
ventures, student 
entrepreneurship 
Tier-1 
city 
Startup Village  
(SV) 
MobME, 
Government of 
Kerala 
Private 
Company 
Kochi2 Information technology, 
acceleration, electronics 
Tier-2 
city 
Technology Business Incubator 
– Kongu Engineering College 
(TBI-KEC) 
Kongu Engineering 
College (KEC) 
Engineering 
College 
Perundurai, 
Erode3 
Technology-led 
entrepreneurship 
Tier-3 
city 
 
 
 
9 Tier I cities are Delhi NCR, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Mumbai, Kolkata, Ahmedabad, Pune 
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4. Results and discussion 
 
An assessment of the historical evolution of STI policy provides insights into why incubators were 
set up (4.1), what various stakeholders involved in incubator activities did and what were the 
outcomes (in 4.2), and how they were able to implement SDGs (4.3).  
4.1 Evolution of public policy for STI-based entrepreneurship 
Our analysis of the evolution of public policy related to STI-based entrepreneurship (Table 3) finds 
that incubators have been central to implementing the broader STI-based policy goals from the 
1980s to the mid-2010s. In that, even prior to 2014, incubators have been vital to implementing the 
policy goals that can now be mapped to Sustainable Development Goals 8 and 9—most 
prominently in supporting entrepreneurship and economic growth and supporting information 
technology (IT) and biotechnology industries.  
 
TABLE 3: Evolution of public policy goals for STI-based entrepreneurship and incubators in India. Source: Authors’ 
compilation from Five Year Plan (FYP) reports and other sources 
Period Announced plans and policies Broader policy goals for STI 
1980 – 1984 • 1982: Department of Science and Technology (DST) 
sets up the National Science and Technology 
Entrepreneurship Development Board (NSTEDB) 
• 1984: NSTEDB starts the Science and Technology 
Entrepreneurs Park (STEP) program 
  
1985 – 1989 • 1986: Government of India sets up the Department of 
Biotechnology (DBT) 
• 1987: DST sets up three pilot incubators with United 
Nations Fund for Science and Technology 
• Generating employment for science and technology-trained 
workforce 
1990 – 1991 • 1991: Government of India engages in country-wide 
economic liberalization reforms 
  
1992 – 1996 
 
 • Generating employment for science and technology-trained 
workforce 
• Training entrepreneurs for biotechnology 
• Commercializing indigenous technology 
1997 – 2001 • 2001: NSTEDB sets up the Technology Business 
Incubators (TBI) program 
• Regional development 
• Training entrepreneurs 
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2002 – 2006 
 
• 2004: Indian Step and Business Incubator Association 
(ISBA) created 
• 2004: DST sets up the Technology Development 
Board (TDB) seed fund for financial support of 
startups 
 
  
• Establishing interfaces between academia, R&D, and industry 
• Training rural populations in IT to encourage entrepreneurship 
• Supporting grassroots innovation 
• Developing biotechnology through creating a venture capital fund, 
commercializing technologies, creating incubators and science parks 
2007 – 2011 • 2007: DST incubators and incubatee startups are 
exempt from paying service tax 
• 2008: Department of Electronics and Information 
Technology (DeitY) launches the Technology 
Incubation and Development of Entrepreneurs 
(TIDE) scheme for supporting electronics, IT startups 
 
  
  
• Supporting STI-based entrepreneurship 
• Fostering academia-industry linkages; 
• Commercializing technology developed at universities using 
incubators 
• Supporting startups financially by facilitating venture funding and 
tax incentives 
• Encouraging entrepreneurs through flexible salaries, startup grants 
• Supporting biotechnology through incubators, parks, and clusters, 
and through public-private partnerships 
2012 – 2016 • 2012: Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) exchange 
/ trading platform launched 
• 2012: DBT launches Biotechnology Industry Research 
Assistance Council (BIRAC) 
• 2012: BIRAC initiates the Biotechnology Ignition 
Grant (BIG) program 
• 2013: DST, MoMSME incubators qualify for 
Corporate Social Responsibility spending 
• 2013: Startups list on SME exchange 
• 2013: DST announces a Science, Technology, and 
Innovation Policy 
• 2014: Government of India revises bankruptcy laws 
• 2014: Government of India encourages venture 
capital, angel investors 
• 2015: State governments’ launch startup policies 
• 2015: Atal Innovation Mission 
• 2015: National Policy on Skill Development and 
Entrepreneurship 
• 2016: Startup India Action Plan 
• Building an inclusive innovation system across sectors for 
entrepreneurship, growth 
• Supporting biotechnology innovation with incubators, parks, and 
clusters for technology transfer and management; new funding 
schemes from public-private partnerships and with BIRAC 
 
For three decades, incubators and startups were central to STI policy, first in their perceived ability 
to generate employment through supporting new enterprises (1980s), then in building academia-
industry and science-technology linkages and supporting technology transfer (early 2000s), and then 
in the specific endeavor to promote startups (2010s onwards). In the early 1980s, to encourage STI, 
the government engaged in incubator-building programs as it set up the administrating body, the 
National Science and Technology Entrepreneurship Development Board (NSTEDB) in 1982, that 
continues to administer publicly-funded incubators to date. The first incubators were set up to 
generate employment through Science and Technology Entrepreneurs’ Parks (STEPs), established 
prior to the economic liberalization reforms of the early 1990s when economic growth was 
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particularly low and the innovation system particularly weak. The general paucity of innovation and 
entrepreneurial activity attracted regular firms interested in the basic infrastructures that STEPs 
offered (e.g., space and an improved supply of water and electricity) rather than STI-based startups 
(Mittal, 2015). These regular firms did not graduate as incubatees even after several years, thus 
contributing to financial challenges and the systematic failure of the STEP program (DST, 2014)10.  
 
By the early 2000s, a new program for Technology Business Incubators (or TBI) focusing on STI-
based startups built on learning from past experiences and shortcomings of the STEP program as 
well as from other failed pilot incubators11. Meanwhile, STI capabilities had grown because of the 
pairing of liberalization reforms of the early 1990s that led to greater availability of technology (as 
import tariffs lowered) with the increase in IT-trained talent (through reverse brain drain after the 
global dot-com bubble of the late 1990s). Incubators became a core part of STI activities, as 
reflected in the creation of an incubator association or Indian STEPs and Business Incubators 
Association (ISBA) designed to foster networks and to share best practices (Ministry of Science and 
Technology, 2004). 
 
In the late 2000s and early 2010s, the public policy goals of strengthening linkages with industry and 
encouraging STI-based entrepreneurial activities generated new incentives channeled through 
incubators. Publicly funded incubators and their tenant incubatee startups became exempt from 
paying service tax in 2007. In 2013, the Corporate Social Responsibility (or CSR) program included 
 
 
10 Of the 16 STEPs that were established between 1984 and 1995, only 6 demonstrated results or financial sustainability 
by 2001. 
11 Incubators had been established in 1987-1990 by the United Nations Fund for Science and Technology (Lalkaka, 
2002) 
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spending on publicly funded incubators in its scope of activities related to social goods—the CSR 
program required corporate companies with high net worth and profits to spend two percent of 
their profits on social issues (Companies Act, 2013).  
 
With this rich experience in setting up incubators, policies and programs enacted since the mid-
2010s raised their ambition in linking STI with societal goals (and mapped them to the SDGs) with 
the support of STI-based incubators. National- and state-level policies and programs emerged that 
specifically targeted the creation of new enterprises and innovation (e.g., Make in India, Startup 
India, Atal Innovation Mission, the National Entrepreneurship Policy, and the National Policy on 
Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (UN India, 2019a, 2019b)) and the promotion of industry 
development, especially for biotechnology. Startup India, now mapped to SDG 9 primarily targeted 
practical barriers to innovation through: (i) easing of complex, lengthy regulatory processes for 
startups, (ii) providing high-risk funding and tax incentives to startups (with a total budget of INR 
100 billion to be distributed by 2020), and (iii) promoting industry-academia linkages including 
through 70 new incubators, startup centers, and research parks (Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, Government of India, 2016). The Atal Innovation Mission now mapped to SDG 8 aimed 
to address social and economic development issues through STI by: (i) building the capacity to 
innovate in middle- and high-school students through 500 new maker-spaces known as Atal 
Tinkering Labs, (ii) creating 100 new sector- or technology-specific incubators, and (iii) extending 
support for existing incubators. While these policies and programs collectively targeted an 
intensification of incubator activity they were built in an absence of lessons learnt from past 
experiences.  
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4.2 Implementing policies: characterizing publicly-funded incubator activity 
 
A multitude of public agencies were involved in implementing the various STI policy goals related to 
setting up incubators. The activities and characteristics of these agencies—i.e. what they did—
influenced the outcomes of incubator programs managed by these agencies as well as the outcomes 
of individual incubators that they funded. 
 
Our assessment shows that government ministries and departments implemented policies in support 
of STI-based entrepreneurship and related SDGs in two ways. First, government departments—
most prominently Department of Science and Technology (DST) through the National Science and 
Technology Entrepreneurship Development Board (NSTEDB), and the Department of 
Biotechnology (DBT) through the Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council (BIRAC)—
engaged in developing incubators. Several other governmental departments indirectly supported 
existing incubators to enable STI-based entrepreneurship in order to promote a particular sector 
(e.g., The Electronics and IT Department (DeitY) for IT) or to advance a particular agenda (e.g., 
promotion of small and medium enterprises through the Ministry of Micro Small and Medium 
Enterprises (MoMSME)) (Upadhyay et al., 2010).12 Second, government departments supported 
startups and entrepreneurial activity by providing access to government funding for those startups 
 
 
12 The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) with its mandate of advancing industry-centric research and 
innovation ran a grants funding program for incubators—Promoting Innovations in Individuals, Startups and MSMEs, or PRISM. 
The Electronics and IT Department (DeitY) focused on electronics and IT-related industries and digital services by offering financial 
support to existing incubators through the Technology Incubation and Development of Entrepreneurs (TIDE) scheme. The Ministry 
of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MoMSME) collaborated with host institutes to designate incubator-like entities that 
encouraged early-stage ideas in a range of sectors (biotechnology, nanotechnology, fruit processing, ceramics, surgical instruments, 
etc.) (MoMSME, 2010). Others include the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), the Department of Industrial Policy & 
Promotion (DIPP) of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and several state departments. 
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that were located in publicly-funded incubators (rather than private accelerators which are not part 
of this study). Startup incubatees had access to governmental financing designed for startup survival 
until the technology demonstration stage before STI-based startups were investment-ready.  
 
The approaches used differed between departments. The DST promoted STI-based startup creation 
across all sectors through the NSTEDB. NSTEDB solicited applications for setting up incubators, 
and approved those that were set up with a partner ‘host’ institute (i.e., a university or R&D center) 
among other criteria (NSTEDB, 2012a). Once approved, the NSTEDB provided initial financial 
support for five years for setting up and managing the incubator. In addition, DST provided funding 
for startups located in its incubators through the Technology Development Board (TDB) and the 
Seed Support System that provided financial assistance (through debt, equity share, or a share of 
royalties) to technology-focused startups physically located in government-approved incubators 
(NSTEDB, 2012b)13.  
 
The DBT supported innovation through BIRAC, a public-sector enterprise for facilitating creation 
of biotechnology-based startups and converting research into products. BIRAC implemented the 
Bio-Incubators Support Scheme that aimed to create new incubators and to strengthen established, 
proven incubators. In addition, BIRAC provided financial support for entrepreneurial activity 
through several funding mechanisms—e.g., the Biotechnology Ignition Grant for developing early 
stage proof-of-concepts and the Small Business Innovation Research Initiative for growth. The 
 
 
13 The NSTEDB provided over INR 2 billion in funding for incubators, evolving from around INR 2 million for each incubator in 
the late 1980s, to an average of INR 30 million by 2015 (Gupta, 2015). 
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Biotechnology Ignition Grant required applicants to be an incubatee in an eligible DBT incubator or 
to have a registered company with a functional R&D laboratory. In general, the DBT focused on the 
specific needs of innovation the life sciences industry—e.g., (i) long gestation period for startups 
(about five years) (ii) high capital intensity of technologies; and (iii) need for highly-skilled workforce 
to operate technical equipment. 
 
The outcomes of policy goals (4.1) and implementation activities related to STI-based 
entrepreneurship resulted in at least 140 incubators that received public funding through different 
central government agencies between 1985 and 2014. Of these, at least 86 Technology Business 
Incubators (TBI) and Science and Technology Entrepreneurs Parks (STEP) received funding from 
the NSTEDB (DST, 2014), making it (and the DST) the single largest supporter of incubators. 
Notably, we found the data on the number of incubators, their activities and funding sources, and 
their outcomes to be highly inconsistent (Table 4), and we therefore point out that the estimate of at 
least 140 publicly-funded incubators is based on our own in-depth assessment and data 
development. 
 
TABLE 4: Estimates of number of incubators in India from the DST (DST, 2014, 2009), governmental policy research 
and planning (NITI Aayog, 2015) and a leading IT industry association (NASSCOM, 2015) are inconsistent. We found 
146 publicly funded incubators (including those with MoMSME) with cumulative support for at least 2000 startups from 
1985 through 2014. 
 
Description DST 2009 DST 2014 Niti Aayog 2015 Nasscom 2016 Authors’ 
Calculations 
Number of 
incubators 
36 reported 
(full or partial data 
on publicly funded 
incubators) 
54 reported 
(publicly funded 
incubators) 
120 140+ (incubators 
and accelerators; 
public and 
private) 
146 government 
supported 
incubators 
Employment 
generated 
13,400+ 32,000+ 40,000 100,000 (in all 
startups) 
- 
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Startups 1170+ (incubated) 
486+ (graduated) 
2000+ (incubated) 
950 +(graduated) 
800+ (graduated 
since 1982) 
500 supported 
annually 
4,750+ 2000+ 
(supported) 
 
Our analysis of the existing publicly-funded incubators in India reveals several shared characteristics 
in how most incubators operate. The following (and Figure 3) discusses the full set of these 
incubators (including our six case studies), their locations, and how they tap into different public-
funding sources, illustrating their shared characteristics and highlighting some differences. First, 
fitting the traditional description of incubators (2.1), STI-based incubators operate as a not-for-
profit entity (as a registered society), or as a company that is required to reuse profits or income and 
cannot provide any dividends to shareholders (a Section-25 company). Second, most incubators are 
set up with a host academic institute or a R&D laboratory with the expectation that the host 
provides technology infrastructures needed for STI along with space and other basic facilities. 84 
percent of NSTEDB incubators have such a host partner (DST, 2014). Third, in addition to 
indirectly supporting funding in their incubatee startups by attempting to strengthen networks with 
private investors, angel investors, venture capital, etc., a key role of incubators in India is to facilitate 
direct financing for startup incubatees from public funding channels that can only be offered to 
startups located in these government-approved incubators (See Figure 3). Fourth, incubators receive 
five years of financial support (those supported by the DST), after which they are expected to 
sustain their own business (DST, 2014). Other government departments also have some provisions 
for incubators to support their expenses (e.g. for SINE). While the DST remains the most 
significant source for most STI incubators, the DBT provides substantial support specifically for 
biotechnology and life sciences incubators (e.g. C-Camp) (Figure 3). But for most incubators, public 
support is not enough and they may generate revenues by renting out infrastructures or by providing 
services to tenant enterprises rather than focused engagement in STI entrepreneurship. And fifth, 
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most incubators are in clusters around metropolitan Tier 1 cities that have strong industrial presence 
(Figure 3). These incubators (e.g. CIIE, IKP, SINE) are often able to tap into a larger number of 
public funding resources to support themselves as well as their startups, likely due to both higher 
quality of startups and a relatively stronger innovation system in the region. When located outside of 
these clusters (e.g. the large number of MoMSME-only supported incubators and the exception that 
is KEC), incubators specifically aim to contribute to regional development and support small 
businesses that generate STI-based entrepreneurship.  
 
FIGURE 3: The network of publicly funded incubators in India and their funding sources shows that most incubators 
are funded by multiple sources (including those analyzed in this paper); these are represented by larger size circles. 
Funding sources after 2014 (such as Atal Innovation Mission) are not included.  
 
But despite the large presence of incubators in urban metropolitan clusters with strong industry 
presence, we found that the actual linkages of most incubators with industry had been weak 
(exceptions include DBT incubators (Aggarwal and Chawla, 2013) and some DST incubators). 
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Public policy interventions on strengthening these linkages had been ineffective. For example, the 
eligibility of publicly funded incubators for Corporate Social Responsibility spending was 
inconsequential for strengthening incubator-industry linkages as corporate firms preferred to directly 
finance more popular social values in support of government initiatives (e.g. Swachh Bharat Mission 
related to clean water and sanitation) rather than address these goals through riskier support for STI 
and entrepreneurship in incubators. Furthermore, when existent, most incubator relationships with 
industry were not through Indian public sector units or domestic firms but through large 
multinational corporates interested in developing domestic technologies for strengthening their 
supply chain networks.  
 
Overall, while some incubator characteristics encompass the activities of a traditionally defined 
incubator (in section 2.1) that is not specifically linked to STI or to developing countries, there are 
aspects of both the ‘incubation system’ in India, and of individual incubators that stand out as 
extending beyond traditional activities. The incubators that were able to implement policy priorities 
and meet the societal and developmental goals linked to SDGs were able to do so because of their 
individual characteristics rather than broader program, industry, or location support. 
4.3 How incubators implemented STI-based entrepreneurship for SDGs 
Our detailed analysis of six incubators identifies common features that show how incubators were 
effective in specifically enabling STI-based entrepreneurship and implementing clear goals that could 
eventually be mapped to the SDGs. We found that these effective incubators primarily implemented 
Goal 8 and Goal 9 and in the process extended their activities well beyond traditional incubator 
functions (described in section 2.1). We summarize these extended activities in Table 5 and discuss 
them in the following.  
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TABLE 5: Incubator activities in our case studies that enabled STI-based entrepreneurship for SDGs 
Incubator Activities linked 
to promoting STI  
Traditional and extended activities linked to promoting entrepreneurship Illustrative list 
of Sustainable 
Development 
Goals mapped 
to incubators’ 
goals 
Attracting innovators 
through capacity 
building efforts 
Addressing 
unmet market 
demands 
Providing 
financing 
for startups 
Building 
networks 
for 
startups 
Managing 
incubators 
effectively 
Center for 
Innovation 
Incubation 
and 
Entrepreneur
ship  
(CIIE) 
• Focusing on 
connecting 
technology-
based products 
with markets 
• Building depth in 
STI-oriented 
sectors through 
market research, 
and networks 
(e.g., in energy, 
water, 
agriculture, 
internet of 
things, fintech) 
• Organizing a national 
business plan 
competition 
(attracting and 
mentoring over 500 
entrepreneurs in 
2016) 
• Using networks and 
resources of host 
business school 
• Engaging in capacity 
building activities in 
business school as 
well as in the country 
• Analyzing 
gaps in the 
innovation 
ecosystem 
• Organizing 
self-
reflection 
exercises to 
ensure gaps 
are 
addressed 
Incubating 
firms in 
sectors that 
meet societal 
needs 
• Investing 
directly in 
startups 
through 
their own 
seed fund 
• Facilitating 
DST 
financing  
 
• Utilizing 
business 
school 
network
s 
• Offering 
virtual 
mentori
ng / 
incubati
on 
• Generati
ng 
revenues 
from 
seed 
fund, 
managem
ent fee 
• Building 
effective 
partnersh
ips with 
private 
sector 
• Improvin
g 
operation
s with 
internal 
evaluatio
n 
• Assessing 
gaps and 
conducti
ng self-
assessme
nt and 
exercises  
Goal 2 
(agriculture), 
Goal 3 (health), 
Goal 7 (energy), 
Goal 8 
(economic 
growth) 
Startup 
Village  
(SV) 
• Collaborating 
with DST for 
developing a 
regional 
innovation 
system focused 
on IT 
• Partnering with local 
government 
• Engaging in capacity 
building 
• Fostering an 
entrepreneur
ial culture 
and 
generating 
entrepreneur
ial 
opportunitie
s in a region 
with very 
little 
entrepreneur
ship 
• Investing 
directly in 
startups 
• Facilitating 
DST 
financing 
• Organizi
ng 
events 
and 
providin
g 
exposur
e to 
successe
s such as 
the 
Silicon 
Valley 
• Generati
ng 
revenues 
from 
seed 
fund, 
managem
ent fee, 
private 
sector 
Goal 8 
(economic 
growth) 
Society for 
Innovation & 
Entrepreneur
ship  
(SINE) 
• Commercializing 
STI-based 
research from 
partner 
engineering 
institute 
• Using networks of 
and resources of host 
engineering school 
 
• Addressing 
lack of 
product 
innovation 
by focusing 
on 
intellectual 
property and 
encouraging 
product 
oriented 
companies 
• Facilitating 
DST 
financing 
• Setting 
up a 
mentor 
pool 
with 
mentor 
for each 
incubate
e 
• Allowing 
startups 
to pay 
using a 
varied 
mix of 
rent, 
equity 
and 
revenue 
share and 
changing 
practices 
according 
to market 
condition
s 
Goal 9 
(research and 
development) 
Technology 
Business 
Incubator - 
• Building regional 
innovation 
system in IT and 
• Engaging in capacity 
building activities in 
partner engineering 
• Incubating 
firms 
focusing on 
• Facilitating 
DST 
financing 
• Partner
ing 
with 
• Maximiz
ing 
revenue 
Goal 8 
(economic 
growth), 
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Kongu 
Engineering 
College (TBI-
KEC) 
related 
engineering 
technologies 
school through 
entrepreneurship 
awareness camp for 
undergraduate 
students  
• Partnering with local 
industry 
product-
based IT 
local 
industr
y 
associat
ion 
through 
lean 
operatio
ns 
• Worksh
ops and 
skills 
training 
for local 
industry 
Goal 9 (IT 
industry) 
Centre for 
Cellular and 
Molecular 
Platforms  
(C-CAMP) 
• Developing new 
technological 
platforms for 
biotechnology 
academia and 
industry  
• Commercializing 
early stage 
biotechnology 
research 
• Fostering 
linkages by co-
housing 
academic 
scientists and 
startups 
• Engaging with 
research and industry 
cluster 
• Managing and 
distributing 
prestigious grants  
• Housing startups and 
individual innovators 
selected through 
national competition 
• Incubating 
firms 
focusing on 
life science 
and biotech 
needs 
• translating 
high risk, yet 
promising 
research 
towards 
industry-
ready 
technology 
• Facilitating 
DST, 
BIRAC 
financing 
• Supporti
ng 
network
s by 
proving 
a 
mentor 
on 
board, 
organizi
ng 
forums 
and 
events 
• Generati
ng 
revenue
s from 
technolo
gy 
platform 
licensing 
fee 
• Improvi
ng 
operatio
ns with 
internal 
evaluati
on  
Goal 9 
(biotechnology 
and life sciences 
industry) 
Incubator at 
IKP 
Knowledge 
Park 
(IKP) 
• Developing a 
regional 
innovation 
system around 
biotechnology by 
building a 
science park 
followed by an 
incubator 
• Engaging with 
research and industry 
cluster 
• Grand Challenges 
Exploration to attract 
bold new ideas in 
partnership with the 
Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation (BMGF) 
in 2011 and USAID 
in 2012  
• Managing and 
distributing 
prestigious grants 
• Incubating 
firms 
focusing on 
life science 
and biotech 
needs 
• Creating 
new 
organization
al structures 
(such as 
makerspaces
) to address 
lack of 
product 
startups in 
India 
• Investing 
directly in 
startups 
through 
the India 
Innovatio
n Fund 
with 
partners 
• Facilitating 
DST, 
BIRAC 
financing 
• Offerin
g 
virtual 
mentor
ing 
• Region
al 
innovat
ion 
system 
mappin
g 
• Generati
ng 
revenue
s from 
seed 
fund, 
manage
ment 
fee, 
grant 
manage
ment 
• Improvi
ng 
operatio
ns with 
internal 
evaluati
on  
Goal 9 
(biotechnology 
and life sciences 
industry) 
 
4.3.1 Identifying and attracting innovators  
 Public policies for STI-based entrepreneurship had historically focused on the creation of 
incubators but had put limited emphasis on building capacity for STI-based entrepreneurship (see 
Table 3). This led to a gap between incubators’ high demand for quality ideas and innovators and the 
low supply of innovative, cutting-edge, technical ideas that were a consequence of insufficient talent, 
weak STI capacity in Indian academic institutions, and the relatively low understanding of markets 
and sectors relevant for sustainable and economic development goals (described in Section 3). 
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Incubators that were able to effectively implement goals related to the SDGs directly addressed this 
gap by engaging in capacity development activities or by benefitting from the presence of well-
developed human capacity14.  
 
Three incubators CIIE, Startup Village SV, and TBI-KEC used the resources of their host partners 
while engaging in capacity building activities to attract innovators and develop ideas. CIIE’s 
association with a business school of ‘National Importance’ (Indian Institution of Management 
Ahmedabad) offered it access to skilled students and networks related to businesses and market-
needs in and beyond STI. CIIE further developed this resource by focusing on innovation-specific 
capacity building activities. More concretely, for the business school in the attached host institution, 
CIIE offered internship opportunities at the incubator, fellowships for student-entrepreneurs, 
prototype grants to offset concerns on education loans, and specialized courses (e.g., on mock fund 
management, technology and design). This provided a safe space for students to experiment with 
entrepreneurship and helped create a pool of entrepreneurs and early stage employees where none 
existed before. Outside the business school, CIIE attracted nation-wide ideas by hosting competitive 
programs (e.g., Power of Ideas) or by managing sector-based accelerator programs that addressed 
 
 
14 In India, while the government recognizes the need for building capacity among students and academic researchers, 
existing government-led efforts have been largely insufficient for reaching the number of students and researchers 
necessary for enabling transformational change. For example, existing plans under the Atal Innovation Mission to build 
500 Tinkering Labs stand to benefit less than 0.7% of 72,000 senior secondary schools. Similarly, plans to build 300 
university-affiliated incubators will benefit less than 40% of over 770 universities. Furthermore, faculty and researchers 
in most universities lack incentives to generate market-driven ideas—faculty hiring and promotion has been based on 
guidelines set by the University Grants Commission (UGC) that prioritized degrees and publications (UGC, 2016, 2013). 
In 2016, UGC guidelines for evaluation or promotion focused on publications and included patents, but did not specify 
entrepreneurship or startups as favorable metrics for faculty evaluation and promotion. Also, UGC rules for ‘study leave’ 
mainly supported research projects only and did not allow full- or partial- employment with any organization during the 
study leave period, possibly due to potential conflict of interest.  
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market-specific needs for societal and developmental goals. This helped nurture good ideas which 
might have been not funded had CIIE not existed. Similarly, Startup Village SV engaged with the 
state government and helped make innovation a priority for the state (through the Kerala 
Innovation Policy). Furthermore, SV prioritized capacity-building in its region to ensure the supply 
of innovators in the long-term, for example by advocating for and helping implement a program 
providing open-source electronics prototyping kits to selected school students to encourage 
experimentation and building innovative products. Finally, TBI-KEC in a regional engineering 
college away from a major metropolitan city managed to attract innovators and market-driven ideas 
despite limited resources. TBI-KEC countered its modest geographically-linked STI resources by 
engaging in capacity building activities—for example, offering training in entrepreneurship and 
organizing workshops for students and researchers to strengthen skills in specific IT areas (e.g., 
Very-Large-Scale-Integration (VLSI) design, embedded technologies). TBI-KEC complemented 
capacity building activities to attract innovators by engaging with local industry associations in the 
closest city (i.e., Coimbatore) and participating in industry-specific trade fairs.  
 
The three other incubators with a well-defined emphasis on STI activities relied on the resources of 
their partners or on their location to get access to good ideas and human capacity. In the case of 
SINE, its association with an engineering ‘Institute of National Importance’ delivered access to 
skilled engineering students, researchers, and alumni networks. The life sciences incubators’ (C-
CAMP and IKP) were built in physical proximity to biotechnology research and industry clusters 
that ensured access to scientific innovation and entrepreneurs. The access to knowledge and 
incubatees extended beyond their physical locations as these incubators managed or distributed 
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several early-stage startup grants (e.g., from Biotechnology Ignition Grant, Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation) that attracted incubatees from the country.  
 
4.3.2 Addressing unmet market demands 
The policy goals for STI-based incubators in India (Table 3) targeted supply-side efforts—i.e., 
supporting technology push (e.g. for IT or biotechnology sectors or for general technology transfer) 
rather than identifying demand-side areas (e.g. those related to societal or developmental goals) or 
using incubators to support demand-driven startups. But the effective incubators that we assessed 
purposefully engaged in meeting societal and developmental demands that remained unmet. Unlike 
most incubators in India, many of the incubators we studied had purposefully-defined goals related 
to addressing market failures and meeting unmet demand (for societal goals that now map to 
SDGs).  
 
CIIE and TBI-KEC emphasized heavily on addressing market needs. CIIE’s market-oriented 
approach focused on assessing the viability of new products in underdeveloped sectors and in 
markets relevant for implementing societal goals. Through its various accelerator programs, CIIE 
used its understanding of business, markets, and market failures in sectors with high societal impacts 
(including agriculture, water, and clean energy). These accelerator programs aimed to find a product-
market fit for advanced-stage innovators who had already developed prototypes or products by 
connecting them with potential stakeholders, customers, or investors. Similarly, TBI-KEC identified 
specific market demands and built its capabilities in electronics and information technologies to 
address these demands, ensuring success despite the challenges related to its limited resources 
outside of an urban cluster. 
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The life sciences incubators (C-CAMP and IKP) focused on developing STI in a particular industry, 
i.e., biotechnology. These incubators recognized the sector specific needs of biotechnology that are 
unmet by market forces—such as the need for resources in the form of special equipment and 
laboratory facilities, or the need for more time (compared to IT) to demonstrate market potential. 
The added resources needed for biotech startups are difficult to obtain worldwide but more so in 
developing countries, given that private investors prefer less capital-intensive, low-risk IT that can 
provide short-term returns. These incubators therefore addressed specific challenges for 
biotechnology and life science startups by offering targeted mentoring, equipment, technical 
expertise, and industry linkages. 
 
4.3.3 Providing access to financing for startups 
Incubators that were effective in implementing societal goals that now map to the SDGs actively 
facilitated early-stage investment in risky STI-based startups by directly administering funding for 
startups from government bodies (similar to most other public incubators in India, see section 4.2). 
But most notably, some incubators developed their own seed funds (besides helping attract external 
investment, as described in 4.2).  
 
IKP, CIIE, and SV were eligible to directly invest in early-stage incubatee startups and were 
registered investors with Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). CIIE ran its own seed 
fund, Infuse Ventures, to provide early stage funding for clean energy startups. IKP helped set up 
the India Innovation Fund for investing in early-stage startups in the life sciences. These 
investments mutually benefitted both incubators and startups—incubators with financial 
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investments in startups were more deeply engaged in startup success while the reputation of these 
handful of effective incubators potentially also had a positive signaling effect in attracting later-stage 
private investments for the startups they were associated with. For example, in CIIE, eighty percent 
of the incubatees received follow-on financing from venture capital or angel investors within two 
years of incubation.  
 
Other incubators facilitated startup financing by implementing public funding schemes related to 
DST, DBT, and others (Figure 3), besides engaging in the traditional incubator function of enabling 
external financial networks. TBI-KEC offered loans to startups through the DST and did not take 
any equity. Incubators in the life sciences (IKP and C-CAMP) administered BIRAC grants to 
incubatees along with administering and distributing other prestigious grants (e.g., grants from the 
Gates Foundation). SINE’s location in Mumbai, that is both a financial hub and an emerging startup 
cluster, provided easy access to venture capital for incubatee startups, with more than 50 percent of 
incubatees receiving investments from angels, venture capital, and financial institutions.  
 
4.3.4 Strengthening startup networks  
Providing startup incubatees access to multi-faceted networks is a core incubator activity worldwide 
(2.2) but was particularly critical in India where market failures (2.1) made it harder for STI-based 
startups to have adequate resources or infrastructures, or links with potential investors and potential 
markets. These networks for knowledge (including technical, strategic, operational, and market 
knowledge), mentorship, finance, and private sector markets played a vital role in incubator 
effectiveness. TBI-KEC exemplified the importance of networks in a non-metropolitan region—
incubatees benefited from the incubator’s close ties with the local industry association (Coimbatore 
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District Small Industries Association) whose chairperson permanently served on the board of the 
incubator15. CIIE, IKP, and SINE utilized their networks to ensure meaningful mentorship for 
incubatees. C-CAMP emphasized on market linkages and exposure to business ideas for its startup 
incubatee scientists through mentor forums and events. Incubators like IKP and CIIE also offered 
startups access to knowledge networks by supporting business plans, technology licensing, 
compliance requirements, intellectual property, etc.  
 
4.3.5 Managing incubators effectively  
The implementation of public policy goals to expand the number of STI-based incubators (section 
4.1) lacked direction on how these incubators would be managed, especially given the risks faced by 
STI-based startups and the market failures related to SDGs (Section 2.1). We found that a key 
determinant of effectiveness was the clear development of management direction that transpired 
from the ability of incubator leadership (managers, managing team, founders, or trustees of the 
incubators) to effectively develop critical incubator activities pertinent to STI-based startups and 
SDGs (described in 4.3.1-4.3.4) while supporting incubator operations. 
 
The importance of managers and management strategy manifested in three ways. One, experienced 
and effective managers were better able to work cohesively with different government departments, 
innovators, academics, and local industries to deliver economic and sustainable development 
outcomes from incubator activities. The experience managers in the six more effective incubators 
had worked in the private or public sectors or had graduated from a top-ranked university with 
strong alumni networks. In contrast, managers in less effective incubators were often professors 
 
 
15 With the help of networks of the industry association, the first product launched out of the incubator was an industrial 
vacuum cleaner part for Hacko (a German company) 
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adept at scaling-up or managing technology but lacking in experience in high-risk activities or in 
connecting STI with market needs. Two, effective managers had the skills to manage incubator 
finances and develop business models that ensured long-term financial stability and a secure flow of 
income for the incubator. The five-year timeline of financial support from DST was at odds with 
supporting STI-based entrepreneurship, given that most early-stage startups need time to develop 
their products and to yield financial returns16. Consequently, while many incubators in the country 
struggled to be financially sustainable, the six incubators that we analyzed managed to generate 
revenues or to minimize costs using different business models. Incubators with their own seed fund 
(i.e., IKP, CIIE, and SV) charged a fund management fee to ensure sustainable revenue generation. 
IKP and C-CAMP complemented incubation activities with income generated through other 
sources—e.g., IKP charged a fee from foundations for managing grants and a fee from companies 
needing specialized biotech equipment; C-CAMP charged a licensing fee from users of its 
technology platforms. CIIE and SV also effectively mobilized private sector investments—e.g., 
CIIE’s accelerator program (iAccelerator) had financial support from Microsoft; SV raised nearly 
INR 25 million of investment for the incubator from the private sector as matching funding. 
Incubators like TBI-KEC engaged in lean operations—i.e., less staff members with multi-faceted 
skills—to minimize costs and maximize revenues. Three, effective managers engaged in regular self-
assessment exercises and in adjusting activities and outcomes to improve performance. While DST 
had no formal or standard reporting requirements on incubator performance, CIIE held regular 
internal reviews that served as guidelines for changes in its activities in accordance to demand-side 
market needs especially related to societal goals. In contrast, DBT rigorously monitored the 
performance of IKP and C-CAMP, resulting in efforts to develop metrics for self-assessment and to 
find opportunities for improvement in economic and sustainable development outcomes related to 
STI-based startups. 
  
 
 
16 For reference, most private equity firms that invest in risky ideas have a ten-year fund, and consequently, a ten-year 
investment horizon. 
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5. Strengthening STI-based incubators for implementing SDGs 
Developing countries have recently renewed the emphasis on enabling STI-based startups with the 
help of various configurations of incubators. For example, in the early 2010s, led by their respective 
governments, “Start-up Brasil” and “Start-up Chile” launched incubator-like programs aiming to 
attract local and international entrepreneurs. China continues to fund its large incubator program, 
and the push to enable STI-based entrepreneurship, especially from universities, continues to come 
from the highest levels of the government (Lu, 2015). Furthermore, even in Kenya, Nigeria, 
Zimbabwe, and Rwanda where the emphasis on STI-based entrepreneurship is relatively new, 
planned incubator-like entities (hubs) are anticipated to play a tremendous role in the economic 
transformation of these countries despite various challenges associated with inadequate education 
and financing (Friederici, 2016; The Economist, 2017).  
India has had a similar renewal of incubator activity in recent years that links to the SDGs, for 
example in its goals of increasing the number of existing incubators through national programs such 
as Startup India (70 new incubators)(UN India, 2019b, p. 9), Atal Innovation Mission (300 new 
incubators)(UN India, 2019a, p. 8) (see section 4.1).  
  
The deepening focus on, and investments in, incubators in developing countries underlines the 
importance of learning from past incubator strategies, operations, and management. This is 
particularly important when the context of (and resources available to) incubators in developing 
countries can vary substantially, while meeting goals that depend on STI will require purposeful 
design (Barbero et al., 2014). Lessons learnt from an analysis of India—given its rich historical 
experience with STI-based incubators along with the need to manage economic development with 
other developmental challenges—are valuable not only for the country’s own future efforts in 
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extending incubation programs but potentially also for other developing countries facing 
comparable challenges or developing new programs.  
 
Our analysis of India is one of the few comprehensive assessments of a complex incubator system 
that has existed for more than three decades(e.g., Lalkaka, 2002; Tang et al., 2013). Our findings thus 
create a foundation for new research centered around India and similar developing countries while 
filling a gap in the systematic understanding of past experiences as STI policies actively organize 
around SDGs. The Indian experience has shown both the potential and the limitations of 
incubators. In many cases, we have seen publicly-supported incubators as being remarkably effective 
in promoting STI-based entrepreneurship aimed at addressing developmental/societal challenges 
such as health and clean energy. But we also have seen that overall the public incubator programs, 
while successful in many ways, can also do better at supporting entrepreneurship more systematically 
and comprehensively.  
 
Our analysis shows that incubators are effective when their activities go well beyond what has been 
commonly defined in traditional incubator literature centered around developed countries (described 
in 2.1). In India our findings suggest that incubators’ extended activities include building human 
capacity, generating their own financing to support startups while also being the mandated channel 
for startups to get public financing (especially in the context of underinvestment by the private 
sector in STI for societal goods), and also helping incubatees better understand and connect to 
market and societal demands in underdeveloped markets. These extended activities are necessary 
because the context in which incubators operate in developing countries that are similar to India is 
vastly different from the countries that have been the subject of most incubator literature to date.  
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We outline below what we believe are some key steps that could help strengthen STI-based 
incubators, especially from the point of view of supporting SDG implementation efforts. 
 
5.1 Building human capacity across the innovation system 
Ensuring a pipeline of STI-based startups for incubators 
 
Policymakers working on STI roadmaps for SDGs must ensure that capacity building for STI 
accompanies any efforts to develop additional STI-based incubators. Public policy must focus on 
systematically broadening and deepening the pipeline of STI-based entrepreneurs rather than relying 
on scattered measures in place in some well-performing incubators to do so (examples in 4.3.1). 
Building STI capacity at multiple levels in universities (i.e., in students, researchers, and faculty) is 
particularly needed in developing countries like India where universities are not the center of 
entrepreneurial activity (unlike in industrialized countries such as the United States) and universities 
are not strongly linked to innovation hubs (such as Silicon Valley).  
 
We specifically suggest the following steps. First, strengthening science and engineering education is 
a necessary foundation for building human capacity to create STI entrepreneurs. We do understand 
that the tail cannot wag the dog, i.e., concerns about more effective STI-based entrepreneurship 
cannot drive higher education policy by itself. But it also is imperative for policymakers to realize 
that efforts to boost STI-based entrepreneurship eventually are dependent on the quality of 
graduates. Second, for researchers and faculty, exposure to the ‘problem environment’ (e.g. the 
technology and market needs associated with specific societal goals such as energy access) can 
develop avenues for linking STI with a larger set of SDGs. When combined with incentives to 
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promote entrepreneurship (e.g., sabbatical year for entrepreneurial activities and flexible human 
resource policies), such activities can broad-base STI-based entrepreneurship. Third, at the university 
level, positive emphasis on startups can fundamentally change negative societal perceptions related 
to entrepreneurship (e.g., entrepreneurs-in-residence to act as role models to students17, extending 
university’s evaluation criteria to include university-based startups). In sum, effective capacity 
building in STI will be necessary for existing and new STI-based incubators to deliver outcomes 
related to the implementation of SDGs. 
 
Strengthening incubator and program managers 
Policymakers considering expansion of STI-based incubators in developing countries must also 
ensure that there is adequate managerial capacity to develop and lead incubator programs (4.2) as 
well as incubators (4.3.4). Both program managers and incubator managers play a key role in the 
implementation of STI policies through incubators18. Program managers can enforce clear hiring 
criteria for incubator managers—e.g., a combination of science and technology, business, and 
managerial capabilities—before funding new incubators while offering training and advisory support 
for the management team. Both incubator managers and program managers can help in optimizing 
operations (e.g., by conducting periodic evaluations, purposefully aligning operational goals with 
specific SDGs) or in optimizing incubator business models (e.g., by developing public-private or 
 
 
17 US universities engage in different activities to promote entrepreneurship among students by increasing interactions with successful 
entrepreneurs (see for example, MIT, 2016; Stanford, n.d.). For example, MIT invites successful alumni entrepreneur for one year 
(entrepreneur-in-residence) to guide students interested in founding startups in the developing world. Another example is the 
Mayfield Fellows Program at Stanford University that brings undergraduate students to Silicon Valley by offering them courses, 
mentoring and networking activities, and a paid internship at a startup in Silicon Valley. 
18 The importance of incubator managers for effective incubators has also been observed in China (Tang et al., 2014) 
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competitive tendering processes to leverage long-term financing in incubators19, developing flexible 
sector-specific or performance-based financing programs for incubators). Managers therefore need 
technology as well as business experience for effective incubators and for the success of an 
incubator program.  
 
5.2 Organizing incubators around clear SDG targets 
Policymakers can proactively use STI-based incubators as a tool to address market demand related 
to specific SDGs (see section 4.3.2). For example, governments could focus on designing incubators 
that have a purposeful objective of linking STI with market needs represented in SDGs (see 
examples in Table 1 related to energy access, health, sanitation, rural areas, water, agriculture, etc.). 
Such objectives could be enabled either through collaborations between government bodies or 
NGOs working with these issues and STI-based entrepreneurs20, or through the procurement 
processes in government agencies (such as ‘advanced market commitments’) for technologies that 
have significant social benefit. Furthermore, given the systematic underinvestment by the private 
sector in STI for societal goods, governments could use incubators to target public funding towards 
early-stage STI-based startups related to SDGs (examples in 4.3.3). A recent example comes from 
 
 
19 Competitive tendering processes have been used to finance public-private incubators. For example, in Israel, the government 
implemented a public-private model for incubators by providing licenses to private equity, venture capital, angel investors, other 
industry, etc. through a competitive process. These incubator license holders financed 15% of the budget for a startup, and the 
government provided grants for the remaining 85%. 
20 For example, the Chicago CleanWeb Challenge hackathon provided city data to innovators and invited them to create technological 
solutions for environmental issues. In another example, the city government of Helsinki, helps startups by using technologies from 
cleantech startups including energy efficiency, low emissions public transport, waste management, district heating, water and air 
quality. Similarly, the local government in Sao Paulo, Brazil eased pre-qualification conditions for procurement tenders in favor of 
SMEs and startups. Sao Paulo also prioritizes procurement from startups as long as their bids are no higher than 10% of bids from 
non-startups. 
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India where a government agency partnered with a domestic philanthropic entity to establish a major 
clean energy incubator that aims to attract international entrepreneurs. 
 
5.3 Improving coordination within, and assessment of, ‘incubation systems’ 
Policymakers need to emphasize on systems-level coordination of existing incubator activities as 
they consider adding new incubators. Experiences from India show that a wide range of government 
programs and agencies engage in developing incubators, each with different policy goals—yet STI 
policy in the country has, so far, failed to learn systematically from past experiences, gather data, or 
organize around a coherent set of policy goals. For example, even the extensive efforts to analyze 
innovation in small businesses in the country through a survey of over 9,000 firms did not consider 
the effects of direct public support to incubators or incubatees on innovation outcomes (NSTMIS - 
DST GoI, 2014).  
Coordination can help improve the effectiveness of individual government-led programs by 
minimizing overlaps and maximizing synergies, especially since our analysis shows that effective 
incubators tap into multiple public financial resources administered by different agencies (see Figure 
3). This coordination is necessary not only between government agencies (and program managers) 
but also between incubator managers—e.g., through forums, sector-specific meet-ups, networks of 
incubators—and can help in systematic sharing of knowledge, experiences, and generation of new 
ideas and networks21 among incubators and incubatees22 (Cooper et al., 2012).  
 
 
21 For example, the Clean Energy Incubators Network in the US aims to highlight best practices on incubation techniques and clean 
energy technologies through workshops that bring together start-ups, incubators, investors, and industry participants working on 
clean energy. 
22 The Indian STEP and Business Incubator Association already organizes such meetings, but these meetings need expansion and 
could be formalized to require all managers. 
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Coordination can be improved in multiple ways: (a) A central body that takes on the role of 
coordinating various publicly-funded incubator programs (and therefore the public funding for 
incubatees) within a country could be very helpful for effective allocation of resources and the 
organization of STI-based incubation around common goals (for example in China23). (b) Top-down 
assessments of existing incubator programs run by such a body could also help define outcome 
metrics needed to assess whether sustainable development objectives have been met, followed by a 
systematic understanding of how to refine the overall approach towards incubation. (c) Given the 
importance of systematic data collection for program evaluation, this body could also mandate that 
all agencies involved in running incubators or financing their incubatees collect and submit data 
regularly, which can become the basis of a national database. (d) Similarly, assessments of 
(technological/sectoral or regional) innovation system dynamics in a country along with assessments 
of market needs related to SDGs could serve as valuable inputs in defining incubator strategy. These 
could be accompanied by sector- or region-specific support services that are imperative for STI-
based startups—including professional technical assistance (e.g., through ‘innovation vouchers’ that 
cover costs of such assistance), legal support for intellectual property and patenting, market research, 
or access to centralized government laboratories that help in testing new technologies.24  
 
 
 
23 China’s Ministry of Science and Technology tracked the progress of the China Torch Program (for science parks and 
incubators) allowing for periodic analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness of the program. The rich data allowed new 
research, for example, Hong and Lu, (2016) empirically found that professional technical services were particularly 
valuable to the incubatees.  
24 The validation of the technical performance of a new product by a government laboratory could help mitigate the perceived risk of 
investing in such a technology. For example, the Comprehensive Initiative on Technology Evaluation (CITE) is a USAID-funded 
program, where researchers at MIT develop consumer reports for new products (e.g., solar lanterns) provided by international aid 
agencies or private companies, to help consumers make informed choices of their purchases. 
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The absence of such systematic collection of data and analysis has been a major shortcoming of 
public policy in this area and urgently needs to be rectified. Since the activities related to data 
collection, coordination and assessment, while beneficial to all incubators and incubator agencies, 
are unlikely to be taken up by any individual entity, a top-down approach may be the only way to 
ensure action on this front. Policymakers with a system-level perspective are best positioned to set 
up a framework that manages such activities as part of STI policy implementation related to 
incubators. When setting up a performance monitoring mechanism, organizations such as the DST 
in India can learn from data gathering and monitoring experiences of other incubator programs, 
such as the Torch Program in China. 
6. Conclusions 
 
Publicly-funded incubators have been, and continue to be, a pivotal element in developing countries 
for promoting STI-based entrepreneurship. Our analysis of STI-based incubators in India shows 
that the goals for publicly funded incubators, even before the introduction of SDGs in 2015, often 
mapped to the sustainable development goals—most notably Goals 8 and 9. Now, as developing 
countries in particular organize public policy around the SDGs and increasingly value the role of STI 
to meet policy goals, lessons learned from past experiences of incubators can be valuable for 
effective design of incubators for implementing STI policy towards SDGs. 
 
India’s incubator experience suggests that incubators have been effective in their SDG related goals 
when their activities extended beyond ‘traditional’ incubator functions of providing infrastructure, 
networks, and services for startups that are commonly defined in the literature. These non-
traditional activities include engaging in human capacity building activities for developing and 
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identifying entrepreneurial talent, channeling public financing for startups but also supplementing 
that with their own seed funds, and in actively supporting areas related to specific SDGs (e.g., 
energy, health, etc.) that are beneficial to society and have a clear and high market demand but may 
not always be appropriately monetized by the private sector. At the root of these extended activities 
is the context under which incubators operate in developing countries that are similar to India. This 
points to the need for a redefinition of incubators and a shift in incubator theory that encompasses 
the outsized role of incubators in developing countries. 
 
Future policy design on using STI based incubators to implement SDGs needs to consider the 
following aspects. First, incubators and public agencies involved incubator ecosystem should 
explicitly align their existing goals and objectives to the SDGs to set clear targets. Second, the 
‘incubator system’ should be coordinated at national level to prevent proliferations of intermediaries 
or of redundant programs. Third, countries with an existing incubation system that do not have a 
robust monitoring of performance should develop such system before setting up new incubators. 
Fourth, countries which are at the early stage of setting up an incubation system should create a 
robust performance monitoring system right from the start of policy implementation. And fifth, a 
robust incubator policy is not enough—human capacity building, focused on the unique demand of 
STI, is needed at multiple levels including at the startup and at the incubator management level. 
 
Overall, public policy for supporting STI-based entrepreneurship for implementing SDGs needs to 
focus on strengthening individual incubators as well as the ‘incubation system’. Additional research 
is needed to develop frameworks and approaches for systematically tracking data on public funding 
of incubators and incubatees, for identifying relevant metrics of success in supporting startups, and 
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for appropriate monitoring and evaluation of incubators and programs and how to map to the 
different SDGs. 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Organizations involved with publicly-funded incubators in India that were interviewed for this study 
 Organizations where interviews were conducted 
1. National Science and Technology Entrepreneurship Development Board (NSTEDB) 
2. Department of Biotechnology (DBT) 
3. Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council (BIRAC) 
4. Indian STEP and Business Incubator Association (ISBA) 
5. Centre for Innovation Incubation and Entrepreneurship (CIIE) 
6. Centre for Cellular and Molecular Platforms (C-CAMP) 
7. IKP Knowledge Park (IKP) 
8. Technology Business Incubator at Kongu Engineering College (TBI-KEC) 
9. Society for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SINE) 
10. Startup Village (SV) 
11. Incubator with a host research institute 
12. Incubator with a host large public university 
13. Incubator with a host large technical university 
14. Venture capital firm in India 
15. Academia (researchers in innovation and entrepreneurship)  
 
Table A2: Illustrative list of semi-structured interview questions for incubator managers and staff. We used the term 
‘success’ rather than ‘effective’ in the interviews for easier communication with the interviewees. 
• What are the intended objectives for the incubator? 
• What have been the envisaged activities to meet objectives? 
• How have incubator activities changed over time? 
• What have been the actual activities been carried out under those programs and by the incubators? And what might 
be the set of activities, a "successful" incubator must perform? 
• What are the processes/determinants which lead to success or failure?  
• How have incubators been able to strengthen the overall ecosystem? 
 
